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ABSTRACT. Unlike traditional start-ups, innovative start-
ups and their respective market partners are faced with severe
problems of asymmetric information due to their lack of prior
production history and reputation. Here, we study whether and
how entrepreneurial signaling via education can help innovative
entrepreneurs signal their abilities to banks and prospective
employees. We argue that innovative entrepreneurs signal their
quality by means of certain characteristics of their educational
history. In particular, we expect potential employees to use an
entrepreneur’s university degree as a quality signal when
deciding whether to accept a job at an innovative start-up, and
we expect banks to use a more precise indicator, namely the
actual length of study in relation to a standard length, as a
signal when deciding to extend credit to an innovative founder.
By contrast, traditional start-ups are not faced with the same
problems of asymmetric information, so we do not expect
employees or banks to require the same signals from them. We
empirically test our hypotheses using a dataset of more than 700
German start-ups collected in 1998/99. All hypotheses are
borne out by the data.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: M13, M5, D82, M21
1. Introduction
Start-ups in general and innovative start-ups in
particular are often seen as an important factor in
economic growth and job creation (Birch, 1979;
Acs and Audretsch, 1990; Storey and Tether,
1996; Bru¨derl et al., 1998). However, compared
to traditional start-ups, innovative start-ups are
faced with unique problems and challenges
(Audretsch, 2000). Because of the innovative
character of their product or business process, no
prior history of comparable cases exists. Outside
ﬁnanciers of an innovative start-up, for example,
have no relevant data about production facilities,
processes, or product markets to use as bench-
marks in evaluating a proposed business plan.
The value of an innovative project is therefore
diﬃcult to judge, even for themost experienced of
creditors. Accordingly, the asymmetric informa-
tion gap between the founder of an innovative
start-up and the creditor is likely to be extraor-
dinarily large, potentially causing problems like
credit rationing.1 Creditors may ration credit,
ﬁnance only a fraction of assets and operations,
claim high collateral, or shorten the length of
their loans. Furthermore, other stakeholdersmay
ﬁnd investments in an innovative start-up par-
ticularly risky, given the lack of history, reliable
benchmarks, and prior reputation. Employees
may be reluctant to accept a job at such a com-
pany, i.e. to invest in company-speciﬁc knowl-
edge if the risk of failure is too high or totally
unknown. Suppliers may be hesitant to grant
trade credit, and customers may be cautious
about ordering products of possibly unaccept-
able quality or products thatmay not be delivered
in due course. Taken together, these problems
reduce the probability of a start-up becoming
successful and growing unimpeded. In other
words, founders of innovative start-upswhoﬁnd a
way to overcome the initial problem of asym-
metric information in the relevant markets are
likely to run their new venture more successfully
(see e.g. Hunsdiek/May-Strobl, 1986; Binks/
Ennew, 1996; Egeln et al., 1997; Falk, 1999)
The objective of our paper is to determine
whether educational signals of innovative foun-
ders can help to solve or reduce their labor mar-
ket and credit market problems.2 Reversing
Spence (1973), who argues that workers signal
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unobservable productivity to an employer by
acquiring an educational degree, we argue that,
likewise, entrepreneurs, whom we assume to be
fully aware of their own productivity, signal
unobservable entrepreneurial productivity by
observable characteristics of their educational
biography to potential employees, or lenders,
customers etc. Since the market partners of
innovative entrepreneurs cannot readily observe
the quality of their venture, they have an incen-
tive to approximate that information via reliable
signals. According to our theoretical consider-
ations we expect potential employees to use an
innovative entrepreneur’s university degree as a
quality signal when deciding whether to accept a
job at an innovative start-up. In addition, we
expect banks to use a more precise indicator,
namely the actual length of study in relation to a
standard length, as a signal when deciding upon
start-up credit for an innovative founder. Al-
though in general there may also be other ways
for highly productive entrepreneurs to signal the
above average quality of their venture, such as
collateral or bonds, we do not consider them to be
a complete substitute for educational signals but
rather complementary instruments, because in
the special situation of innovative founders they
are not available, or not to a suﬃcient degree.
Accordingly, for innovative entrepreneurs, we
expect educational signals to be particularly
important and therefore investigate their impact
on labor market and credit market access.
Since the situation is diﬀerent for traditional
start-ups, where potential creditors or employees
can draw upon prior start-up cases and business
history to evaluate the risk of a start-up, we do
not expect the same signals to be used to classify
the quality of innovative and of traditional
start-ups. To test our hypotheses we use German
ﬁrm level data collected in 1998/99, containing
790 start-ups which were founded between 1992
and 1997 in the Cologne area. All predictions are
borne out by the data, leading us to conclude
that educational signals are eﬀective instruments
for reducing the problems of asymmetric
information on the credit and labor market for
innovative but not for traditional founders.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, we summarize the literature on entre-
preneurial signaling. In the third section, we
explain what kind of educational signal may act
as a valid signal for innovative entrepreneurs and
derive ﬁve empirically testable hypotheses. In
the fourth section on ‘‘Data, Measurement
Issues, and Methodology’’ we describe our data
set, which is derived from a large sample of
start-ups in the greater Cologne area, Germany,
and discuss measurement and methodological
issues. In the fourth section, we present our
econometric results; and ﬁnally, we summarize
and draw some tentative conclusions.
2. Entrepreneurial signaling in capital and labor
markets – theoretical analysis
Start-ups in general, and innovative start-ups in
particular, have no prior ﬁnancial or internal
labor market history, and hence, no reputation.
For innovative product or business processes,
there is no experience and no benchmark on
which to build. Given this situation, it is most
likely that a founder will be better informed
about the potential gains, losses, and risks of the
innovative venture than outside stakeholders
like ﬁnanciers, whom the founder needs for
credit, or employees, who are needed at the
latest when companies start to grow (58% of the
start-ups in our sample started with at least one
employee; 42% without any employees).
2.1. Literature
The situation of asymmetric information can
cause severe problems such as adverse selection
and even credit rationing. Many papers focus on
the eﬃciency of debt-ﬁnanced ventures in
general, and on credit rationing or under-
investment in start-ups in particular. One strand
of these papers assumes the existence of credit
rationing and concentrates either on the causes
of credit rationing3 and underinvestment, on the
eﬀects of credit rationing on eﬃciency, or on the
eﬀects of corrective government actions on
credit rationing (see Parker, 2004, sec. 5 for a
survey of the literature). A second strand of
papers argues that it is possible to eliminate
credit rationing by using various instruments to
reveal hidden information. These instruments
range from reputation through relationship
banking, signaling and/or screening to using
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collateral and bonds. Examples of screening by
banks oﬀering a menu of contract options
include collateral (cf. Bester, 1985), joint liability
under group lending (cf. Ghatak and Guinnane,
1999); oﬀering limited and unlimited liability
debt contracts to entrepreneurs (cf. Chamley,
1983) and oﬀering a high initial interest rate in a
multi-period setting (cf. Webb, 1991; Boot and
Thakor, 1994). Parker (2004) oﬀers a summary
of the screening arguments favoring the idea
that rationing can be eliminated by banks
writing more sophisticated ﬁnancial contracts to
reveal the hidden information.
We argue that most of these instruments that
reveal hidden information are unsuitable for
innovative start-ups: since the business idea and
the company are both totally new, there is no
reputation or experience to build on.4 Suﬃcient
collateral is often beyond the means of a typical
founder and therefore banks often cannot
even use extended collateral as a screening
mechanism (Parker, 2004).
However, we argue that educational signaling,
as introduced by Spence (1973) for employees, is
a plausible way of dealing with the information
asymmetries of innovative entrepreneurs, as it
implies using a person’s past behavior in other
activities, namely schooling, to draw conclusions
about their future productivity in a new venture.
Moreover, such an instrument is applicable even
for the most innovative founders.
The role of educational signals for entrepre-
neurs has rarely been analyzed in depth, despite
some early mentions in the economics literature.
In the late 1970s there was a ﬁrst discussion
on how the educational degrees of employees vs.
entrepreneurs could be used to test the
educational screening hypothesis (cf. Wolpin,
1977; Lazear, 1977; or more recently, Lofstrom,
2000). Wolpin argues that entrepreneurs should
have lower levels of education if schooling is
merely a signal, because there is no need for
entrepreneurs, who are by deﬁnition self-
employed, to signal. Lazear, on the other hand,
argues that educational signals might not be
irrelevant for entrepreneurs because customers
may use their credentials as a signal in assessing
product quality. However, this argument was
never systematically followed up in entrepre-
neurship research. While educational signaling
is sometimes brieﬂy mentioned in the entrepre-
neurship literature (see for example Noote-
boom, 1993) it has rarely been studied in-depth,
either theoretically or empirically.
In this paper we attempt to close this gap by
showing in our theoretical section why and what
type of signals are relevant in which entrepre-
neurial market, and by presenting empirical
evidence to support our hypotheses. The study
that comes closest to our analysis is that of
Parker and van Praag (2005), who study how
the performance of a start-up is aﬀected by
capital constraints and human capital. Since
they for the ﬁrst time treat human capital and
ﬁnancial capital as an endogenous variable, their
paper includes a question similar to ours as part
of their model.
They concentrate on type I credit rationing
and extend the model of Bernhardt (2000) to deal
with the impact of human capital on ﬁrm per-
formance. Unlike Bernhardt (2000), they allow
for heterogenous entrepreneurs (diﬀering in
exogenous ability) and study the consequences
under two diﬀerent assumptions, i.e. unobserved
or observed ability of the entrepreneur (the latter
case being similar to that assumed in our paper).
Whereas, according to their model, in the case of
unobserved ability, lenders use a common
screening technology to assess ability and
therefore rate all lenders with the same error, in
the case of observed ability, lenders assess and
classify ability by certiﬁed human capital (i.e.
years of schooling), which is assumed to perfectly
reﬂect ability. Parker and van Praag (2005) show
that under the assumption that physical capital
and human capital are not complements, greater
human capital decreases borrowing constraints.
However, if human and physical capital are
complements, the eﬀect is ambiguous if no
additional assumptions are made. With the
additional assumption that better educated
entrepreneurs are less over-optimistic and
therefore demand capital more carefully than
poorly educated entrepreneurs, greater human
capital still reduces borrowing constraints. What
we call entrepreneurial signaling, is similar to
what Parker and van Praag (2005) analyze in
their case of observed heterogenous ability. We
also assume heterogeneity among innovative
start-ups facing the bank as a lender and the
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worker as a potential employee with the problem
of adverse selection. Since in the case of
innovative start-ups other instruments like rep-
utation, business history or collateral are non-
existent, creditors and potential employees can
only use the educational history of the founder as
a screening device. Based on the propositions of
Parker and van Praags model with heterogenous
ability and asymmetric information, we also
expect innovative entrepreneurs to be faced with
fewer credit constraints (and fewer labor short-
ages) if they possess a better educational signal.
However, since we assume that in the case of
traditional start-ups, banks as well as potential
employees have numerous other and more reli-
able indicators with which to screen heteroge-
nous entrepreneurs, such as their business and
employment history or collateral and bonds, we
do not expect that educational signals have a
similar eﬀect on credit constraints or labor
shortages for traditional start-ups. But even for
innovative founders, not all educational charac-
teristics can serve alike as reliable productivity
indicators. As shown by Spence (1973) there are
several conditions that have to be met in order
for an educational signal to be able to guarantee
a separating equilibrium, i.e. an equilibrium
which reliably separates entrepreneurs with high
probability of success from entrepreneurs with
low probability of success.
2.2. Preconditions for educational signals
According to Spence (1973) educational degrees
have to meet two additional criteria to become
valid as a signal separating high quality from low
quality employees. In the original model, where
employees signal their unobserved productivity,
the degree ﬁrstly must be closely related to the
type of productive capability employers are
looking for in ﬁlling a particular job vacancy.
For example, if a company is looking for a
creative and trendy hairdresser it might not be
best to hire a Ph.D. just because he has the
highest educational degree among the appli-
cants. Secondly, in order to guarantee a sepa-
rating equilibrium, the cost to the employee of
obtaining the degree must be strongly negatively
correlated with the employee’s hidden produc-
tivity. Only in this case will low-quality
employees not invest in the degree, because their
costs are higher than their future returns. Only if
both conditions are met will employers willingly
pay a premium for the signal (the educational
degree) because only then does it guarantee a
separating self-selection equilibrium. Reversing
Spence’s original model, we have to determine
what type of educational history for an innova-
tive founder is likely to meet these two condi-
tions. Thus, in what follows we ﬁrst study the
type of ability that is required of innovative
founders and makes them more likely to be
successful on innovative markets. In the second
step we analyze what type of educational history
is likely to separate high ability from low ability
innovative founders due to the diﬀerent cost
attached to them.
2.3. Ability requirements of innovative founders
and requirements in the educational system
As shown in a number of empirical studies,
innovative markets are characterized by rapid
technological change, short product life cycles,
and rather volatile market conditions (see e.g.
McDermott and O’Connor, 2002). Founders
who want to survive in such an environment
must be able to work continuously and rap-
idly through a large amount of new market
information, quickly and eﬃciently ﬁltering out
what is important and ﬂexibly deriving new
solutions. Given this environment, a founder
needs analytical and problem-solving skills, self-
direction, and endurance (Lu¨ck and Bo¨hmer,
1994). On the other hand, in dynamic environ-
ments like those of innovative start-ups, narrow
occupational skills are very quickly worthless.
And the more innovative a product, a business
process, or a market is, the shorter is the half-life
of speciﬁc occupational skills. However, the
ability to reason, analyze, communicate, and
crosscheck information is of enduring value,
even for the most innovative founders. This
assumption was conﬁrmed when entrepreneurs
were asked about the usefulness of a variety of
their skills in a survey of more than 700 entre-
preneurs5 (cf. Table I). Innovative founders ﬁnd
general analytical and problem-solving skills
more helpful than traditional founders.
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Conversely, traditional founders consider
more specialized occupational skills, such as
product knowledge, marketing skills and ﬁnance
tools to be more helpful (see Table I). Within
the German educational system it is assumed
that the ﬁrst type of skill is typical of a university
education, whereas the latter type is typical, e.g.,
of a traditional vocational education. Our
assumption is conﬁrmed by a comparison of the
educational backgrounds of innovative and
non-innovative entrepreneurs: 47% of innova-
tive founders hold a university degree, whereas
only 39.7% of traditional founders do so. It
therefore seems reasonable to assume that a
university degree is likely to provide the typical
skills that are a precondition to becoming a
successful innovative entrepreneur.
2.4. Educational signals and separating equilibrium
If it is assumed that general analytical and
problem-solving skills are the most important
skill requirements for a successful innovative
founder, the next question is what kind of edu-
cational history guarantees a separating equi-
librium for these types of skills. The ﬁrst part of
our answer concerns the type of education
associated with the analytical and general skills
mentioned above. Within the German educa-
tional system it is common knowledge that these
general analytical and problem-solving skills are
the ones required for university studies. They are
considered to be indispensable for obtaining a
university degree. Thus, founders holding a
university degree can be assumed to be better
prepared to run an innovative start-up than
founders without a university degree. In addi-
tion, we argue that students with a higher level of
problem-solving and analytical skills are not
only able to complete their studies but also to
study faster and receive their university degree in
a shorter period of time than students with a
lower level of problem-solving skills. Since in
Germany students have high ﬂexibility regarding
the length of their studies, it seems natural to use
the timespan it takes a student to ﬁnish a
university degree as a precise signal of their
underlying capability. Thus, length of study,
which is not to be confused with years of
schooling in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of mea-
suring the stock of human capital,6 should be
given priority as a signal if this information is
available.
A number of studies support our assumption
that length of study is a reliable indicator for
classifying the productivity of university degree
holders. Berning (1982) investigates whether
certain work and study techniques used by law
students determine the time they take to com-
plete their studies. He ﬁnds that students who
take longer to graduate show lower concentra-
tion, are less able to work without interruption,
suﬀer more often from self-motivation prob-
lems, and are less able to identify obstacles and
ﬁnd solutions to overcome them. Diﬀerences in
TABLE I
Usefulness of diﬀerent kinds of skills and knowledge
for start-upsa
Were the following skills and
subjects you acquired during
your university education
helpful for your start-up?
(1 = not at all helpful;
5 = very helpful)
Mean
value
Analytical and general
problem solving skills
Innovative start-ups 4.21
Traditional start-ups 4.10
Product-speciﬁc knowledge
Innovative start-ups 3.73
Traditional start-ups 3.87
Knowledge on taxation
Innovative start-ups 3.28
Traditional start-ups 3.63
Marketing-speciﬁc knowledge
Innovative start-ups 2.97
Traditional start-ups 3.50
Labor law and labor
relations-speciﬁc knowledge
Innovative start-ups 2.77
Traditional start-ups 3.17
Finance-tools
Innovative start-ups 2.89
Traditional start-ups 3.21
aJudgements of 790 founders included in the Cologne
Founder Study (CFS).
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length of study, then, are the result of systematic
productivity diﬀerences. Furthermore, Schaeper
and Minks (1997) show not only a correlation
between better grades and shorter length of
study but also that extracurricular activities do
not slow down good students. Thus, it is rea-
sonable to assume that within the German
university system a shorter length of study (all
else being equal) can act as a potential signal for
higher ability students7 and thus for more
productive innovative entrepreneurs.
In the second step we have to ask whether
length of study is likely to guarantee a sepa-
rating equilibrium, i.e. whether it reliably
separates high quality types from low quality
types of innovative founders. In order to
guarantee a separating equilibrium, the costs of
attaining a signal have to be suﬃciently nega-
tively correlated with ability, i.e. the cost of
signaling high quality has to be substantially
higher for a person with a low level of analyt-
ical and problem solving skills, less endurance,
and less ability for self-directed work than for a
person with high level of skills (including the
signal not being manipulable by the students
themselves). There are two types of empirical
evidence that we can draw on to provide evi-
dence for a strong negative correlation in the
German university system. First, the failure
rate at German universities is quite high,
making it very expensive for low ability stu-
dents to complete studies for a university de-
gree. In 2002, the average failure rate was
about 25 percent across all ﬁelds and universi-
ties (IWD, 2002), so the cost for low ability
students literally extends to inﬁnity. In addi-
tion, there is high variance in length of study,
which shows a strong negative correlation with
the quality of the students as measured by their
grades (although one could naively assume that
taking more time to study might lead to better
grades due to longer study times). We can
clearly illustrate our assumption by looking at
some numbers within the German university
system. In the ﬁelds of management and eco-
nomics, for example, the standard length of
study for a Master’s degree in Germany,
according to oﬃcial study guidelines, is
4½ years, but the average length of study is
much longer at about 5½ to 6 years. Only 14.5
percent of the students are able to ﬁnish their
studies within the standard time (Wis-
senschaftsrat, 2002); all others take much
longer due to exams or failed courses they have
to repeat. Unfortunately, there is no Germany-
wide data on the relation between length of
study and grading, but we were able to obtain
full record data from the largest university in
Germany, the University of Cologne, which is
ranked among the highest in its ﬁelds. In stark
contradiction to the naı¨ve view, the data clearly
conﬁrm our assumption of a strong negative
relation between length of study and ability (cf.
Table II). In 2001, the average length of study
for a Master’s in management and economics
at the University of Cologne was approximately
6½ years (13 semesters). Only 3 percent of the
students were able to ﬁnish in fewer than 9
semesters, while 10 percent needed more than
16 semesters. The faster students (with lower
than average length of study) are the better
students (with better grades) while slower stu-
dents have worse grades, which clearly indicates
that length of study can be used as a reliable,
non-manipulable quality indicator.
TABLE II
Length of study and average grades in diplomas in man-
agement and economics at the University of Cologne
(fall 2001)a
Length
of study
N Percentage Average
gradeb
Less than
4.5 years
9 3.3 2.00
4.5 years 12 4.0 2.40
5 years 56 18.6 2.53
5.5 years 25 8.0 2.59
6 years 84 27.6 2.75
6.5 years 18 6.0 2.90
7 years 37 12.3 2.93
7.5 years 7 2.3 2.90
8 years 22 7.3 2.99
More than
8 years
30 10.0 3.14
Average:
6.9 years
Total:
300 Students
Average
grade: 2.88
aNote: data from Oﬃcial Exam Report, Faculty of Busi-
ness, Economics and Social Sciences, University of Cologne
(Cologne, 06.05.2002).
blower grade numbers indicate better diplomas (best
grade = 1.0; worst grade = 5.0).
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Thus, given the empirical evidence for
Germany, it is reasonable to assume that
educational signals establish a separating equi-
librium, because holding a university degree
guarantees a minimum level of the type of skills
required to run an innovative start-up (students
with too few skills fail before they ﬁnish a uni-
versity degree). Secondly, a shorter length of
study guarantees a higher level of those same
skills than a longer length of study because
length of study is negatively correlated with
quality of students.
2.5. Availability of information
However, since a person’s educational history
can only serve as a signal if it is available to a
market partner looking for a screening device to
overcome asymmetric information, it is ﬁrst
necessary to determine what type of information
is available to whom. Here the situation is
diﬀerent for banks as lenders and for workers as
potential employees. Empirical studies show
that commercial banks always use a number of
screening devices to evaluate a start-up, among
which a detailed business plan is indispensable
(Egger and Gronemeier, 1999).8 Therefore, if
banks consider a university degree and length of
study valuable information, they can easily ob-
tain it and use it for their credit decision. Since
we argue that length of study is a more telling
signal than just holding a degree, we expect
banks to make use of it. Thus, innovative
founders who took less time to obtain a given
degree should have fewer problems acquiring
the credit they want than slower students.
Unlike banks, workers as potential employees
usually have only limited information about the
educational history of their future employer. In
most cases, employees can easily discover whether
a founder holds a university degree.9 However, it
is unlikely that an employee will ﬁnd out about
the length of study. Therefore, we expect that
employees can and will use the existence of a
university degree as a signal for the unobservable
quality of the innovative founder, but not the
length of university study.10 Thus, innovative
founders with a university degree will have less
diﬃculty recruiting qualiﬁed employees than
innovative founders without one.
2.6. Patents as an alternative signal for banks
Patents are very similar to educational signals as
a screening device. Holding or not holding a
patent can also serve as a credible signal for the
unobservable quality of an innovative founder
because only the most creative and productive
founders will be able to ﬁle a patent.11 Since
patents are again only readily observable by
banks (by means of the business plan), but not
by employees, we expect patents to function as a
signal for banks but not for potential employees.
To summarize, we expect the data to conﬁrm
the following ﬁve patterns (Hypotheses 1–5):
A. Labor market shortages
1. Innovative founders with a university degree
have less diﬃculty recruiting qualiﬁed employ-
ees than innovative founders without a univer-
sity degree.
2. For traditional founders, holding a university
degree does not make a diﬀerence (or only very
little) in recruitment problems because, unlike
innovative founders, they are not subject to the
same problem of asymmetric information.
B. Credit market constraints
3. Innovative founders with a shorter length of
study have fewer problems obtaining the credit
they ask for than innovative founders with
longer length of study for the same degree.
4. For traditional founders a shorter length of
study does not make a diﬀerence to credit
problems.
5. Innovative founders holding a patent have less
diﬃculty obtaining credit than innovative
founders without patents.
3. Data, measurement issues, and methodology
To test the predictions about entrepreneurial
signaling, we analyzed a dataset of 790 start-ups
in the Cologne area. The data were collected in
1998/99 in a project on regional determinants
and eﬀects of entrepreneurship and cover a
representative sample of start-ups from 1992 to
1997.12 Almost two thirds of the start-ups are in
the service sector (62 percent); a quarter are in
retailing, and 13 percent are in manufacturing.
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Eighty-seven percent of the ﬁrms are true
start-ups (23% are takeovers); however, only 18
percent of the start-ups are innovative start-ups,
while the rest are traditional start-ups. Average
turnover in the ﬁrst year was 728,000 Euros. The
founders were predominantly male (79 percent),
36 years old on average, and often highly qual-
iﬁed (44 percent held a university degree and 7
percent a doctoral degree). For each start-up, we
have a 6-page questionnaire with a broad spec-
trum of questions on the founder and his or her
personal background (education, experience),
the economic background of the start-up
(sources and diﬃculties obtaining start-up
capital), its current ﬁnancial situation, human
resources issues, production technology, net-
works, and social capital. (for more details on
the Cologne Founder Study, see Backes-Gellner
et al., 2000).
3.1. Dependent variables
As a ﬁrst dependent variable we need a variable
to measure a founder’s diﬃculty in recruiting a
suﬃcient number of employees. Unfortunately,
we do not have explicit data on labor shortages.
However, we do have a variable specifying what
percentage of employees must be classiﬁed as
overloaded with work in the year 1997. We as-
sume that work overload among employees is
highly correlated with job vacancies and thus
with recruiting problems, because incumbent
employees must take over the workload of va-
cant positions. Therefore we use the percentage
of employees classiﬁed as overloaded with work
as an indicator for recruitment problems. Since
labor shortage can also be driven by excessive
growth or turnover we have to control for short
term business cycle eﬀects and therefore include
proﬁt and turnover in the years prior to 1997 in
our labor market regression.13
As a second dependent variable we need a
variable measuring diﬃculty in obtaining a
suﬃcient amount of credit at reasonable condi-
tions (interest rates, collateral, maturity of
loans). There are several ways how credit con-
straints can be measured. Previous research has
tended to use indirect indicators of wealth,
inheritance or windfall gains to test the eﬀect of
capital constraints on performance (Evans and
Jovanovic, 1989; Black et al., 1992, Holtz-Eakin
et al., 1994, Lind and Ohlsson, 1996). A positive
correlation between wealth and entrepreneur-
ship performance is said to indicate capital
constraints. The drawback of these approaches
is that they do not reveal whether the entrepre-
neurs were able to obtain external capital. Par-
ker and van Praag (2005) construct a measure of
capital constraints in which the total amount of
capital used at the start of the new business is
related to the amount of capital required.
Although we do not have hard facts on the
amount or the conditions of our founders’
credit, we do have a very good indirect indicator
that should reﬂect all these aspects simulta-
neously. In our survey, founders were asked
whether, during their start-up phase, it was dif-
ﬁcult to obtain the credit they initially needed
for their start-up. They answered using a 5-point
Likert scale from 1=very problematic to 5=not
at all problematic. It is important to note that
our rating of the credit problems does not refer
to the current situation in the company but to
the situation at the beginning of the start up,
which is exactly what the variable should cover
for our purposes. The respondents were asked
whether they had experienced diﬃculty in
obtaining suﬃcient credit at the time they star-
ted their business. In using a subjective rating we
assume that less favorable hard facts will be
reliably reﬂected in a lower subjective evaluation
score. Such an assumption is supported by Binks
and Ennew (1996), who argue that a subjective
classiﬁcation is a useful proxy for credit con-
straints because individual diﬃculties in
obtaining credit correspond to unfavorable
credit conditions. Moreover, Van Praag (2003)
uses a direct individual indicator for initial
credit constraints which is very similar to ours
(‘‘Did you experience problems in obtaining
suﬃcient (external) capital at the start of your
venture?’’). On the other hand, Parker (2004)
points out that claims by survey respondents
that they face(d) credit constraints should be
treated with great caution because they are
prone to self-serving bias whereby entrepreneurs
might blame banks for inherent shortcomings.
However, since our respondents were asked a
few years after start-up time, we assume that this
bias had dissipated by the time of our survey.
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A subjective indicator, furthermore, has the
advantage of capturing various kinds of
constraints in just one indicator. On the basis of
a large German data set, Egeln et al. (1997) ﬁnd
a very strong correlation between a ﬁrm’s self-
classiﬁcation of credit problems and the oﬃcial
rating given by Creditreform, Germany’s largest
credit-rating agency. Thus, we are conﬁdent that
a subjective rating of credit problems during the
start-up phase reliably identiﬁes the real credit
problems of the start-up. Since our subjective
rating refers to credit problems in obtaining the
initial credit during the start-up phase, there is
no need to control for performance variables as
would be the case if we asked about credit
problems in an already running company.
Hence typical endogeneity problems connected
with entering performance variables in a credit
constraints regression are also avoided.
3.2. Independent variables
To test our ﬁve hypotheses we need three major
explanatory variables. First, we distinguish three
educational levels based on the educational
history of the founder: 1. founders who hold a
doctoral degree as their highest university de-
gree, 2. founders who hold a standard university
degree, such as a Diploma, a Master’s or Mag-
ister Artium, and 3. founders who never received
a university degree, including both those who
never started higher education and those who
are dropouts. Our dummy variables are DD for
holding a doctoral degree and UD for holding a
university degree (the reference group consists of
the founders with no university degree).
Our second independent variable, the length
of study, is not as easy to measure as the de-
grees, given the German university system with
all its heterogeneity. Respondents were asked
how many years they had taken to ﬁnish their
respective degree, which gives us numbers for
actual length of study. However, we cannot
simply compare these numbers across diﬀerent
types of universities. For example, ﬁnishing a
degree in a typical research university in 6 years
might be fast, whereas ﬁnishing a degree in a
university of applied sciences in 6 years might be
very slow when compared to what is standard
for that type of university. Therefore, we have to
render the raw numbers comparable by a stan-
dardization. In order to do so, we use the
average number of years at a given university as
a benchmark to make the individual lengths of
study comparable.14 Thus we have students
studying faster than average (FASTUD) and
students studying more slowly than average
(SLOWUD). The reference groups are founders
without a university degree. Our third indepen-
dent variable, patents, is a dummy variable.
PATENT=1 if a founder holds a patent, and
zero if he or she does not hold a patent.
Finally, we must separate innovative from
non-innovative start-ups, because we only
expect the university degree and length of study
to be eﬀective as a signal for innovative but not
for traditional start-ups. This is daunting, given
the diﬃculty of clearly deﬁning ‘‘innovative-
ness’’ and due to additional data restrictions
(Acs and Giﬀord, 1996). In general, a variety of
indicators can be used to measure a ﬁrm’s
innovative activity. These are typically R&D
expenditure, number of patents held, average
R&D-intensity in an industry, or various sub-
jective measures of innovation (cf. Acs and
Audretsch, 1990; Bru¨derl et al., 1996). In our
dataset, we have information on patents, R&D
expenditures at ﬁrm and industry level, venture
capital backing, and collaboration with external
research facilities. Table III, which shows how
these variables are correlated in our sample, is
used to identify a reliable indicator to separate
innovative from non-innovative start-ups.
Correlations among our ﬁve innovation
measures indicate that they are all positively
correlated. However, the level of signiﬁcance
shows that only the number of patents and
R&D intensity on industry level are closely
related to all other indicators. On ﬁrm level,
collaboration with external research facilities,
venture capital backing, and R&D expenditure
perform slightly worse, in the sense that they
correlate with a smaller number of indicators.
Therefore, to encompass most of the informa-
tion in one indicator and at the same time avoid
too many missing cases we should use either the
number of patents or R&D intensity on industry
level (a similar method is used by Bru¨derl et al.,
1996). Since the number of patents is available
only for a very small number of ﬁrms in our
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dataset, we decided to use R&D intensity on
industry level to distinguish innovative from
non-innovative founders because it is available
for all start-ups in the sample. However, as is
shown in Table III, R&D intensity correlates
signiﬁcantly with all other innovation indicators
(a similar classiﬁcation is used by Almus and
Nerlinger, 1999).
In addition to the variables derived from our
ﬁve hypotheses, we use a number of standard
control variables, which are speciﬁed inTable IV.
3.3. Methodology
Since our dependent variable ‘‘percentage of
overloaded workers’’ is left censored at zero and
right censored at 1, we use a Tobit model to test
our labor market implications. To test our credit
market implications, we use an ordered probit
model, because the dependent variable ‘‘credit
problems’’ is ordinal, which makes OLS
regressions inappropriate.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Labor market signaling of innovative
entrepreneurs
Table V displays the results of Tobit estimations
with the percentage of overloaded workers as
the dependent variable and INNOVSU, DD,
UD, SLOWUD and FASTUD as the main
explanatory variables.
In a ﬁrst model, we use a speciﬁcation that
includes only the vector of control variables
that was described in Table IV and the
dummy variable for innovative (INNOVSU) vs.
non-innovative founders. In a second model, we
use the two university education dummies (DD,
UD) and patents as additional variables. And in
a third model, we also include interactions
between doctoral degree and innovative start-
up, university degree and innovative start-up,
and patent and innovative start-up. With the
interaction term, we allow the educational sig-
nals to diﬀer for innovative and non-innovative
start-ups because, in accordance with our theo-
retical considerations, we expect entrepreneurial
signaling with education to be important for
innovative founders only. All our hypotheses on
entrepreneurial signaling on labor shortages are
borne out by the data.
Firstly, in accordance with our hypotheses,
we ﬁnd that university degrees (UD, DD)
and patents do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
labor shortages as long as innovative and non-
innovative founders are not separated. An
incremental F-test clearly indicates that the
variables introduced in the second model, i.e.
DD, UD and PATENT, do not add explantory
power (F(3,209) = 1.12; Prob>F = 0.3424).
However, if we distinguish between innovative
and non-innovative founders, educational
degrees do matter. An incremental F-test shows
that the goodness of ﬁt increases signiﬁcantly
(F(6,206) = 2.30; Prob>F = 0.0357), which
conﬁrms the relevance of the interaction variables
added in model 3. The interaction variable
UD*INNOVSU captures the additional eﬀect a
university degree has for an innovative start-up.
The coeﬃcient is negative and highly signiﬁ-
cant, meaning that innovative founders with
a university degree have signiﬁcantly lower
TABLE III
Correlationb matrix of various innovation indicatorsa
Patents R&D intensity
on ﬁrm level
Venture
capital backing
Collaboration with
research facilities
R&D-intensity
in industry
Patents 0.097** 0.069* 0.148*** 0.094***
R&D investments
on ﬁrm level
)0.007 0.147** 0.137***
Venture capital 0.012 0.093**
Alliances with
research facilities
0.097**
aNote: Data are from Cologne Founder Study (CFS).
b*** Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level; * Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
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percentages of overloaded workers than inno-
vative founders without a university degree. This
is consistent with hypothesis 1. At the same time,
UD by itself is not signiﬁcant, which is consistent
with hypothesis 2. On the labormarket university
degrees do not serve as a signal in general, but
only in the special case of innovative start-ups.
As anticipated in our theoretical considerations,
patents do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on labor
shortages. Somewhat surprisingly, doctoral de-
grees also have no signiﬁcant eﬀect (in any of the
models). One reason could be the small number
of cases in our sample. A second reason could be
that most of the hidden information relevant for
an innovative start-up is already captured by the
ﬁrst university degree and/or that between a
doctoral and a standard university degree a
pooling and not a separating equilibrium exists.
As for our control variables, we ﬁnd that
faster growing start-ups (FASTGR) and
growth-targeted start-ups (with plans for future
investments, GROSU) have signiﬁcantly more
problems recruiting the required number of
qualiﬁed employees, which is consistent with
previous empirical evidence on labor shortages
of start-ups. Take-over start-ups (TAKEOSU)
have signiﬁcantly less diﬃculty with labor
shortage problems, which we think is because
they have already existed for a longer time and
can be assumed to have a reputation, making
the educational signaling of the founder no
longer relevant. In addition, they are a less risky
venture for a potential employee because their
failure rate is signiﬁcantly lower on average,
which is also consistent with the negative sign
we ﬁnd. All other control variables are also
unsurprising.
4.2. Credit market signaling of innovative
entrepreneurs
To test our hypotheses on credit problems we
use ordered probit estimations. The dependent
variable should be interpreted as follows: the
lower the subjective credit problem indicator,
the more diﬃculty the founder experienced
obtaining the required credit during the start-up
phase (the situation is worse); the higher the
indicator, the easier it was to obtain the required
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credit (the situation is better). Table VI displays
the results for four diﬀerent models.
In the ﬁrst model, we again begin with a
speciﬁcation including the vector of control
variables only and the distinction between
innovative and non-innovative start-ups. We
ﬁnd that credit problems are signiﬁcantly worse
for innovative start-ups than that for non-
innovative start-ups, which is in accordance with
our assumption that the probability of infor-
mation asymmetry is substantially higher for
innovative start-ups.
In the second model we add our ﬁrst set of
explanatory variables, i.e., the university degree
dummies (UD, DD) and the interaction terms
with innovative start-ups (INNOVSUDD,
INNOVSUUD). University degrees alone
obviously do not serve as a signal for creditors,
either in general or for innovative start-ups. In
the third model, we add length of study and the
respective interaction term to see whether banks
use the more precise signal ‘‘length of study’’ for
their credit decisions for innovative start-ups
(hypothesis 3) but not for non-innovative start-
ups (hypotheses 4). First of all we ﬁnd that
adding the length of studies and the respective
interaction terms increases the goodness of ﬁt
substantially. Secondly we ﬁnd that the only
signiﬁcant variable is the interaction term
FASTUD * INNOVSU, which is signiﬁcantly
positive as expected in hypothesis 3. Innovative
founders who completed their studies faster than
average are better at obtaining credit than those
whose studies took longer than average. Thirdly,
we ﬁnd that FASTUD and SLOWUD have no
signiﬁcant eﬀect on credit problems in general,
which is consistent with hypothesis 4.
In the fourth and last model, we add patents
and the respective interaction term and ﬁnd that
patents signiﬁcantly reduce the credit diﬃculties
of innovative start-ups, which conﬁrms
hypothesis 5. If innovative founders hold a
patent, it is signiﬁcantly easier for them to
obtain credit. Furthermore, being among the
faster students makes it even easier to obtain
credit.
TABLE V
Tobit regression results: Entrepreneurial signaling and labor market constraintsa
Independent variablesc,d Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeﬀ. (t-value) Coeﬀ. (t-value) Coeﬀ. (t-value)
INNOVSU 11.036 (1.24) 11.434 (1.28) 36.371 (2.53)**
DDb 21.617 (1.51) 20.582 (1.37)
UDb 2.637 (0.28) 15.430 (1.50)
PATENT 13.831 (0.87) 11.934 (0.61)
DD * INNOVSU 34.621 (0.98)
UD * INNOVSU )48.530 ()2.69)***
PATENT * INNOVSU 9.872 (0.31)
PROFSU )7.421 ()1.05) )6.543 ()0.93) )3.856 ()0.56)
LNTURNO 4.057 (2.07)** 3.989 (2.05)** 3.221 (1.69)*
FASTGR 11.303 (1.46) 11.396 (1.47* 9.903 (1.31)
TAKEOSU )15.661 ()1.60) )14.475 ()1.48) )11.606 ()1.21)
HSD 11.772 (1.44) 7.956 (0.77) 3.455 (0.34)
FAGE 0.413 (0.96) 0.348 (0.79) 0.337 (0.79)
MALE 11.795 (0.84) 11.658 (1.18) 10.620 (1.11)
SUAGE 2.188 (0.84) 2.075 (0.79) 1.541 (0.60)
CONST )81.559 ()2.57)** )79.289 ()2.49)** )69.442 ()2.23)**
Number of observations 223 223 223
LR-Chi2 23.67** 27.00** 37.83***
R2-Pseudo 0.0157 0.0179 0.0251
aNote: Data are from Cologne Founder Study (CFS)
bReference group: no college/no university degree
cAll regressions include dummies indicating economic sectors (manufacturing, trade, services)
d*** Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level; * Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
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To summarize, studying faster than average
makes it easier for innovative founders to obtain
credit, but not for non-innovative founders,
which supports our assumption that for tradi-
tional start-ups, banks can build on their expe-
rience, use traditional benchmarks to evaluate a
business plan and use traditional screening
devices such as collateral, making it unnecessary
to use educational signals to evaluate an
unobservable quality. However, for innovative
start-ups, banks cannot build on experience and
prior information or reputation, so they use
educational signals and patents when deciding
upon credits. In reaching this decision, they do
not take just any element of an applicant’s
educational history as a credible signal, but
instead carefully select the most telling indicators
that are available. They prefer more precise sig-
nals, i.e., length of study, rather than less precise
signals, i.e., the university degree itself. And they
obviously use multiple signals if available, i.e.
they use patents and length of study at the
same time. The results are consistent with our
entrepreneurial signaling explanation.
As for our control variables, we ﬁnd an
inverted U-shaped relationship between equity
rates (EQR) and credit problems. This ﬁnding is
consistent with what we ﬁnd in the literature on
optimal ﬁnancial structures of (new) ﬁrms (e.g.
Harris and Raviv, 1991, Bru¨derl et al., 1996;
Huyghebaert and van de Gucht, 2002). Job
experience (JOBEXP) and previous founding
TABLE VI
Ordered probit regression results: Entrepreneurial signaling and credit market constraintsa
Independent variablec,d Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef. (z-value) Coef. (z-value) Coef. (z-value) Coef. (z-value)
INNOVSU )0.501 ()2.12)** )0.680 ()1.97)** )0.727 ()2.07)** )0.710 ()2.03)**
DDb 0.257 (0.71) 0.351 (0.96) 0.311 (0.85)
UDb 0.134 (0.49)
FASTUDb 0.234 (0.70) 0.199 (0.59)
SLOWUDb 0.197 (0.61) 0.130 (0.40)
PATENT 0.601 (1.11)
DD * INNOVSU 0.226 (0.33) 0.269 (0.39) 0.237 (0.34)
UD * INNOVSU 0.334 (0.68)
FASTUD * INNOVSU 1.529 (2.28)** 1.549 (2.31)**
SLOWUD * INNOVSU )0.372 ()0.63) )0.941 ()1.47)
PATENT * INNOVSU 1.792 (1.68)*
EQR 1.549 (1.24) 1.651 (1.31) 2.059 (1.61) 2.134 (1.66)*
EQR(SQR) )1.543 ()1.41) )1.599 ()1.45) )1.889 ()1.69)* )2.056 ()1.82)*
DEBTC 5.6e)08 (0.37) 4.5e)08 (0.28) 4.3e)08 (0.26) )2.7e)07 ()1.30)
JOBEXP 0.019 (1.32) 0.023 (1.51) 0.026 (1.71)* 0.031 (1.99)**
FOUNDEXP 0.218 (1.02) 0.257 (1.18) 0.328 (1.49) 0.421 (1.89)*
PQUAL )0.108 ()1.04) )0.099 ()0.95) )0.099 ()0.94) )0.114 ()1.08)
PPRICE 0.119 (1.37) 0.105 (1.18) 0.117 (1.30) 0.120 (1.31)
TAKEOSU )0.010 ()0.03) )0.033 ()0.10) 0.074 (0.23) 0.261 (0.80)
HSD 0.012 (0.06) )0.118 ()0.46) )0.227 ()0.87) )0.085 ()0.32)
SECONDJ )0.089 ()0.35) )0.105 ()0.41) )0.186 ()0.71) )0.263 ()0.98)
FAGE 0.001 (0.04) )0.004 ()0.28) )0.003 ()0.18) )0.010 ()0.66)
MALE )0.259 ()0.94) )0.281 ()1.02) )0.310 ()1.12) )0.309 ()1.11)
MARRIED 0.332 (1.52) 0.317 (1.37) 0.317 (1.37) 0.331 (1.43)
CHILD )0.328 ()1.35) )0.308 ()1.24) )0.299 ()1.20) )0.279 ()1.12)
Number of obs. 170 170 170 170
LR-Chi2 33.11* 34.65* 43.45** 50.40**
R2-Pseudo 0.062 0.065 0.081 0.094
aNote: Data are from Cologne Founder Study (CFS)
bReference: no college/no university degree
cAll regressions include dummies indicating economic sectors (manufacturing, trade, services) and founding year (1992–1997)
d*** Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level; * Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
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experience (FOUNDEXP) both reduce credit
problems signiﬁcantly, which is in line with
ﬁndings on success factors for start-ups showing
that job experience and experience as a founder
reduce the likelihood of failure. The rest of the
control variables are unspectacular and contain
no surprises.
5. Conclusion
Compared to traditional start-ups, innovative
start-ups are faced with the problem that there is
no prior history of similar production or busi-
ness processes. Additionally, their ex ante de-
fault risk is higher, and, due to missing company
history and prior ties, there is no reputation to
make up for the missing information. As a re-
sult, innovative start-ups, and their market
partners are faced with severe problems of
asymmetric information. We focus on the role of
educational signals in solving or substantially
reducing these information problems and
thereby increasing the potential success of
innovative start-ups. We focus our analysis on
credit and labor market problems because it has
been shown that they are crucial to the success
of innovative start-ups, i.e. shortage of credit in
the early start-up phase and shortage of quali-
ﬁed employees in the initial growth period. In
analogy to the standard labor market-signaling
model developed by Spence (1973), we assume
that not only employees but also entrepreneurs
credibly signal their quality by means of certain
characteristics of their educational history.
However, as Spence shows, educational char-
acteristics must meet certain conditions to
become a valid and credible signal. Therefore,
we ﬁrst analyze what kinds of capabilities are
particularly required to run an innovative start-
up and what kind of educational career requires
these same capabilities (ﬁrst condition). In a
second step, we study what aspect of an educa-
tional career guarantees a suﬃciently negative
correlation between the cost of acquiring the
signal and the quality of the innovative founder,
so as to guarantee a separating equilibrium
(second condition). Finally, we determine what
kind of information is available to which market
partner at what cost. Based on a detailed anal-
ysis of the concrete situation for employees and
banks concerning these three conditions, we
hypothesize that potential employees will use a
university degree as an important quality signal
when deciding whether to accept a job at an
innovative start-up, and that banks will use a
more accurate indicator, namely the length of
study, as a credible signal when deciding upon
credit for an innovative founder. To our
knowledge, an entrepreneur’s university degree
and the actual length of study have not been
used before in investigating the determinants of
credit and labor market shortages in the case of
innovative start-ups.
Banks will, additionally, use the existence of a
founder’s patents as a signal for the quality of
his or her innovative start-up. Although we do
not expect the same signals to be used for tra-
ditional start-ups, since the problem of asym-
metric information is not as pronounced, and
because there are a number of other (often more
reliable) instruments available for screening the
quality of traditional start ups.
We tested our hypotheses using a dataset of
790 start-ups collected in and around Cologne
in 1998/99. Consistent with what we expected,
we ﬁnd that innovative – and only innovative –
founders holding a university degree have fewer
problems of labor shortage, i.e. a lower per-
centage of overloaded workers, indicating that
they have fewer problems attracting enough
qualiﬁed employees. Also consistent with our
hypotheses, we ﬁnd that innovative – and only
innovative – founders experience fewer prob-
lems obtaining the credit they initially need to
start their venture if they ﬁnished their uni-
versity degree faster than others, i.e. in less
than the average number of years. Further-
more, if innovative founders hold a patent, this
also makes it easier for them to obtain suﬃ-
cient credit. As predicted by our theoretical
considerations of asymmetric information,
patents do not reduce credit problems for tra-
ditional start-ups, which conﬁrms our assump-
tion that patents merely act as a signal in
banks’ credit decisions, but less as an instru-
ment guaranteeing property rights and market
shares, because then they would also act in the
same way for traditional start-ups.
To conclude, we show that entrepreneurial
signaling via education is obviously a powerful
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instrument in overcoming typical problems of
asymmetric information for innovative start-ups,
an aspect which has rarely been analyzed. The
dearth of studies is largely due to a lack of ade-
quate data. We present a unique database cov-
ering not only a wide range of variables on the
newly founded enterprises but also on the foun-
ders and their educational background, labor
market experience, and personal history. Since
one of our main results is that a university degree
and length of study are important signals, par-
ticularly for innovative founders, we conclude
that – contrary towhat popular discussion during
the internet boom period often suggested –
completing (!) an education with a degree is par-
ticularly important for innovative founders, even
more than for traditional founders. During the
boom years of the new economy, many students
in Germany (and elsewhere) considered it a waste
of time to complete their studies and work for a
degree because innovative businesses did not
seem to require or honor traditional educational
values. Students dropped out en masse, many of
them with the aim of becoming one of the new
stars on the glamorous innovative start-up-hori-
zon. However, our empirical results indicate that
traditional educational patterns and values, such
as ﬁnishing an education and meeting a time
target, are even more important for innovative
markets than for traditionalmarkets, where other
credible quality indicators might be available.
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Notes
1 Asymmetric information and adverse selection does not
necessarily result in credit rationing. And credit constraints
do not always imply ineﬃciency or market failure (Stiglitz
and Weiss, 1983; Besanko and Thakor, 1987). De Meza and
Webb (1987) for example propose a model with assump-
tions similar to those of the most inﬂuential credit-rationing
model of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), but with the opposite
eﬀects; i.e. over-investment and too much entrepreneurship
instead of credit rationing. However, the majority of studies
assume credit rationing and analyze either Type I rationing
(rationing via loan size) or Type II rationing (rationing via
selection of loan applicants) and their negative conse-
quences such as a shortage of start-ups.
2 Note that the models speciﬁed and tested in our paper
concentrate on access to capital and labor markets and the
impact of educational signals. Thus, our study is in line with
previous research of Bates (1990), Storey and Tether (1996),
Binks and Ennew (1996), Blumberg and Letterie (2004) or
Astrebo and Bernhardt (2005). This paper is not concerned
with new venture performance (e.g. survival duration,
business proﬁts, etc.) and direct eﬀects on ﬁnancial or hu-
man capital (see for example, Evans and Jovanovic, 1989;
Cooper et al., 1994; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994; Moog and
Backes-Gellner, 2003; Van Praag, 2003; Moog, 2004 or
Bosma et al., 2004, Parker and van Praag, 2005).
3 However, tighter constraints might still not be ineﬃ-
cient. They might decrease proﬁts of entrepreneurs, but this
does not necessarily imply ineﬃciency or market failure
(Parker and van Praag, 2005) because borrowing con-
straints can be an eﬃcient market reaction. On the other
hand, if one assumes positive externalities like innovation
spillovers, which are often shown to be important in a re-
gional context, credit restrictions might become a problem
and could justify government intervention to relax them –
but only in special cases.
4 Lenders usually rely on ‘carcass’ evaluation and refrain
from thoroughly screening every single innovative entrepre-
neur’s credibility as this is unlikely to be cost eﬀective. Ravid
and Spiegel (1997) argue that start-ups in particular are too
small and complex, economies of scale are non-existent and
therefore thorough individual screening does not pay.
5 The descriptive data were generated as a by-product of
the study described in section 3 of this paper. For more
details on the dataset see section 3.
6 ‘‘Years of schooling’’ as typically used in Anglo-Saxon
studies is a proxy for the highest school level attained,
whereas our variable ‘‘length of study’’ can be used to
distinguish graduates provided they have obtained a uni-
versity degree. The key diﬀerence is that more years of
schooling or education signal higher quality whereas, here,
higher length of study signals lowers quality.
7 The assumption is also supported by a major study by
Bankhofer and Hilbert (1995), who investigated the
recruitment process of companies. They found that 74
percent of the ﬁrms considered grades, and 69 percent
considered length of study to be (very) important for hiring
decisions. The assumption is also consistent with a number
of empirical studies on labor market entrants’ wages.
Schaeper and Minks (1997) analyze the wages of 11,300
labor market entrants with university degrees and ﬁnd that
students who study faster than average earn an additional
200 DM/month (approximately $100). In addition, Minks
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(1992) shows that students taking longer than average have
higher unemployment spells after ﬁnishing their studies and
are more often forced to accept less favorable jobs (e.g.
temporary work and freelance activities).
8 A successful business plan provides detailed informa-
tion about the loan applicant via a CV showing educational
institutions, ﬁelds and dates of study, and degrees earned.
9 In the simplest case, an employee can read the name-
plate at the start-up oﬃce or check the telephone book or
oﬃcial registers. Also, with little eﬀort, an employee can
ﬁnd out about an employer’s educational background from
a Chamber of Commerce.
10 It is important to note that for a signaling equilibrium to
exist it is not necessary that an innovative founder is aware
that he is acquiring a signal when attending university (as
argued in the traditional signaling model for employees): all
a potential founder has to know is that by obtaining more
education he or she will increase future proﬁts. Nor do
employees have to know anything about signaling; all that is
necessary is that employees faced with the decision to accept
a job in an innovative start-up believe that holding a uni-
versity degree makes an innovative founder more successful,
with better prospects for future work.
11 Amit et al. (1990) argue that prototypes, which are
similar to patents, are a valid quality signal for innovative
founders because more productive founders will develop
prototypes at lower costs than less productive founders.
12 The data were collected with ﬁnancial support from the
German National Science Foundation (DFG) under project
number STE 628/5-1, the German Founder Bank (Deutsche
Ausgleichsbank, DtA) and the Cologne Savings Bank. We
thank Petra Moog and Gu¨ldem Demirer for introducing us
to their dataset.
13 Because our performance variables (proﬁt and turn-
over) are lagged variables, i.e. they cover the period prior
to the period in which we measure the percentage of
overloaded workers, it seems reasonable to assume that
performance is not endogenous in our labor shortage
regression. To see whether our results are stable, we also
estimated the labor market models without performance
variables. All estimated results are highly stable. Overall,
(prior) performance does not seem to have a large impact
on labor shortages in start-ups anyway. To control for
wage eﬀects we also estimated models including a variable
‘labor cost share’ (i.e. relation of labor cost to ﬁrm’s total
cost). Here again, the estimated results do not diﬀer sig-
niﬁcantly from the results in the previous speciﬁcation.
Since we lose a large number of cases in this enlarged
speciﬁcation due to a substantial increase in missing
variables, we decided to drop the variable ‘labor cost
share’ in our ﬁnal speciﬁcation.
14 Because of data restrictions, we were only able to
calculate reliable averages for the diﬀerent university types
of the founders who received their degree from one of the
Cologne universities (81.3 percent of the sample), but not
for those studying at universities other than Cologne.
Therefore, we had to select only Cologne students for our
regression. Among them we created two groups of students:
Cologne fast and Cologne slow students.
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